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Abstract:  
While certain levels of fear and anxiety seem quite appropriate to the experience of birth, it is 
detrimental if they become overwhelming. This article strives to understand birth-related affects 
more thoroughly by asking which affects are commonly involved, and how they come about. Martin 
Heidegger provides the most developed phenomenology of affects available to us. A 
phenomenological perspective proves useful because its close description allows categorising 
affects into mundane ones like fears (evoked by specific entities and circumstances) and existential 
ones like anxiety. Anxiety concerns our existence in its entirety and brings us face to face with the 
fact that we are finite beings in a groundless existence. Giving birth means needing to negotiate 
existential affects in a mundane situation. The birth-giving woman is dependent on others to take 
her seriously in her experience of affective turmoil in which anxiety and wonder, fears and 
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Who’s Afraid of Birth? Exploring Mundane and Existential Affects with Heidegger 
 
I had no choice, needed to make no decision. I was moved because 
something was in preparation that was new and came from us, and 
because the world seemed to me to be waxing. Like the moon before 
which one is supposed to bow three times when it is new and stands 
tender and breath-coloured at the start of its course. […] Now I 
trembled at the very thought. 
Ingeborg Bachmann, “Everything” 
 
When it comes to the emotions associated with the process of childbirth, fear and anxiety take 
priority. They hold a peculiar status because on the one hand, they seem a natural or normal 
emotional response and are expected to give way to relief and happiness later. On the other hand, 
they have detrimental effects if they become too strong or even get out of control. Martin Heidegger 
claims in his existential philosophy that fear and anxiety are not naming the same mood, but need to 
be distinguished. This article will take an existential-phenomenological approach in order to 
develop a more differentiated idea of the emotions or “affects” involved in the birth process and the 
conditions that evoke them. The term “affects” is chosen in accordance with the neutrality of the 
phenomenological perspective to describe how women are emotionally affected before and during 
the birth process.1 
  
Phenomenology of Affects 
An initial definition of phenomenology can be provided by describing the focus of phenomenology 
as concerned not with what we perceive and experience, but how we perceive and experience it. 
Normally, we dwell in the world by attending to objects as well as tasks and states-of-affairs; in 
other words, we concentrate on what is to be done. Phenomenology requests for us to change this 
attitude, focussing away from everyday tasks and objects towards how we approach and experience 
world. In the case of birth, such a change of focus seems helpful since the experience is not really 
about objects, and what is crucial about it cannot be reduced to tasks or practices. 
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Because it is not about objects, phenomenology is particularly suited for an analysis of 
affects. The rather substantial topic of affects will be addressed here only in a preliminary fashion to 
prepare for the discussions of fear, anxiety, anticipatory anxiousness, and wonder below. 
Firstly, the advantages of a phenomenological approach to affects will be outlined by mentioning 
briefly some shortcomings of the main alternatives. Secondly, we will provide a frame for 
Heidegger’s discussion of affects, specifically fear and anxiety, by previewing it with the most 
common objections. In examining Heidegger’s discussion of fear and anxiety, we can then 
immediately see to what extent he is vulnerable to these objections and to what extent our 
investigation of birth requires us to expand the framework provided by him. Let me respond to a 
potential discomfort from the beginning: it might appear surprising that we will follow Heidegger’s 
analysis so closely, especially considering the substantial objections his analysis evokes. Yet we 
will see that his account carries much further than it first seems. Despite the fact that there are a few 
moments at which we need to add to his elaborations, his analysis overall proves very resourceful 
for understanding the differences between the affects involved in birth, the reasons behind them, 
and the possibilities to create conditions that would facilitate a balance between the relevant affects 
and minimize the danger of detrimental anxiety and fear.  
Concerning the philosophical history of approaching affects, Heidegger maintains that the 
“fundamental ontological interpretation of the affects has hardly been able to take one step worthy 
of mention since Aristotle” (BT, 139). Furthermore, Heidegger praises Aristotle for realizing that 
affects are not as such a matter of psychology; Aristotle treats them in the Rhetoric and discusses 
how they relate to speech and speakers, and we will return to this important connection below.  
 Affects are undoubtedly difficult to describe in a fashion that moves beyond the merely 
subjective, and yet phenomenology is determined to accomplish such a move. Philosophers may 
have made little progress with the topic since Plato and Aristotle, but why not trust psychology as a 
discipline that focuses exactly on the soul (psyche) where already the Ancient Greeks located 
affects? In his critique of psychology as a science, Heidegger is mostly concerned with certain 
questionable metaphysical assumptions underlying psychology.2 Traditional psychology, like other 
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sciences, treats human beings as if their mode of existence was equivalent to an object, that is, 
something merely present-at-hand (vorhanden), merely present in the physical way (BT, 49). 
Biology and physics become paradigmatic sciences, and the relations between humans or the 
relation between a human being and his or her world are treated in terms of natural causality. An 
affect turns into a reaction that is caused by a specific object which can be quantified and, if so 
desired, removed. Once a quantitative framework with its behaviourist implications has been 
accepted, affects indeed appear alterable. Yet our experience shows that affects overcome us, and 
that we are more vulnerable to them than a traditional psychological account makes it seem.  
What does a phenomenology of affects have to offer, in contrast? It investigates affects as 
phenomena arising out of being-in-the-world. Usually, we think of affects as something occasional, 
subjective, and unreliable. Yet affects do not just dependent on the subject, on my personality and 
disposition; otherwise, my affective disposition would be much more stable, and I would not 
experience affects as linked to a certain object or situation. At the same time, affects are not merely 
object-dependent either: different people are affected differently by the same object or situation. 
Heidegger concludes that a mood “comes neither from ‘outside’ nor from ‘inside,’ but arises out of 
being-in-the-world” (BT, 136). Affects emerge from the interplay between inside and outside, or 
between Dasein and world. 
We assume that we experience affects every so often, for example, when we are sad or 
happy. Heidegger emphasizes that we always have a mood, even if this mood is just indifference, 
and that it is a mistake to only focus on the extreme cases of moods. The fact that we are always in 
some mood also makes it easier to understand that we do not first perceive or know something in 
order to then develop an emotional approach in a second step; only by abstraction can affects be 
considered something secondary. Instead, we always already “turn toward or turn away” (BT, 135). 
If an investigation of affects requires an analysis of being-in-the-world, phenomenology emerges as 
the most suitable method.  
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Fear versus Anxiety 
The significance of the concept of world makes it possible to distinguish between such affects 
which are concerned with entities in the world and those fundamental affects which concern 
everything there is, the whole, or the world. Heidegger explains this distinction in his famous 
analysis of the distinction between fear (Furcht) and anxiety (Angst). Before we attend to the 
relevant sections of Being and Time, let me outline two objections against Heidegger’s analysis 
which by now qualify as classic objections. This procedure will allow us to already read 
Heidegger’s account with the relevant objections in mind and consider to what extent the criticism 
is justified.  
Firstly, it has been objected that Heidegger places too much emphasis on anxiety. Secondly, 
Heidegger has been accused especially by French phenomenologists (such as Jean-Paul Sartre, 
Emmanuel Levinas, Jacques Derrida) to not give sufficient attention to the Other, or the other 
person. These two objections have been combined into one by Klaus Held who argues that it is 
exactly the emphasis on anxiety that causes difficulties for Heidegger in addressing issues of 
intersubjectivity or being-with-one-another.3 According to Held, the analyses presented in Being 
and Time are one-sided because they focus on anxiety at the expense of wonder and on death at the 
expense of birth4. We will return to the connection between birth and wonder below. 
Heidegger approaches fear and anxiety by asking specific questions which reveal the 
determining dimensions of affects, such as the “in the face of which (Wovor) we fear,” “fearing 
itself,” and “that which fear fears about (Worum)” (BT, § 30). To prepare for the contrast to anxiety, 
Heidegger summarises his discussion of fear in the following way: “Our interpretation of fear as an 
affect has shown that in each case that of which we fear is a detrimental entity within-the-world 
which comes from some definite region but is close by and is bringing itself close, and yet might 
stay away” (BT, 185). The detailed analysis leading up to this summarizing statement occurs in 
Section 30 where Heidegger explains how the object of fear is not yet close enough to be in our 
control, and how we do not quite know whether it will come closer or not, which increases rather 
than decreases the fear (BT, 140).  
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Especially the uncertainty as to when the entity might be coming close and the fact that this 
uncertainty (and even the possibility of “staying away”) enhances rather than decreases the fear is 
highly relevant for our case of birth. It is one of the most unsettling features of birth that it can 
begin to happen at an almost entirely unpredictable moment: as a premature, normal, or late birth; 
during night or day; while the pregnant woman is at home, in a public place, outdoors, etc. 
Although every pregnancy will lead to some birth such that birth will never entirely “stay away,” it 
is quite possible that the actual birth is so different from the anticipation that some of the feared 
elements might indeed never come about.5  
But does birth even fit the definition of “that in the face of which we fear”? Heidegger 
claims that fear always comes about through some “detrimental entity within-the-world.” More 
precisely, this entity can have the character of an object or of Mitdasein6, that is, an entity whose 
mode of being is existence, like our own (BT, 140). Yet when it comes to fear in the face of birth, 
what we fear are not objects, nor is it the infant to be born (Mitdasein), but the event of birth. An 
event is not an entity. What follows from this? Firstly, there is the possibility that Heidegger’s 
statement might be wrong, and fear might not always be about an object or about Mitdasein. Yet we 
should only consider this option after giving Heidegger the reader’s benefit of doubt and see 
whether the claim might still be defensible. Another possibility would be that birth is not something 
in the face of which we experience fear, but something which gives rise to anxiety. This possibility 
will now be explored because the contrast between fear and anxiety reveals both affects more 
clearly.  
While we experience fear in the face of an innerworldly entity, anxiety is characterized 
exactly by the lack of such an entity. Because we cannot identify what is causing anxiety, we tend 
to be evasive and say that it is “nothing:” no thing, nothing specific, no definite entity. Rather, 
everything becomes problematic. Nothing in the world can provide a hold, and in that sense, “the 
world has the character of completely lacking significance” (BT, 186). The contrast to fear becomes 
more defined when returning to the dimensions Heidegger distinguishes. That in the face of which 
we fear is an innerworldly entity, and that which fear fears about is our existence to which this 
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entity will be detrimental if it comes to hit us. For anxiety, that in the face of which (Wovor) we 
experience anxiety and that which we are anxious about (Worum) coincide. It is nothing specific 
that threatens us, but rather, our existence as a whole is revealed in its precariousnesss and 
vulnerability. For this reason, anxiety is not tied to any specific moments or experiences, but can 
arise in the “most harmless situations” (BT, 189). In and through this experience, “being-anxious 
discloses, primordially and directly, the world as world” (BT, 187) -- although obviously not on the 
level of cognition, but on the level of affects. As everything in the world becomes insignificant, we 
are made aware that we usually rely on a context of significance or a world which we take for 
granted and which seems to be our home, but which is on the most fundamental level uncanny.  
Returning to the question of birth, we should now be in a position to decide whether it 
causes fear or anxiety. Unfortunately, neither the description of fear nor the one of anxiety seem to 
entirely fit. For fear, we encounter the already mentioned problem that birth is an event and not an 
entity, and the fears involved in the event do not seem to be about specific entities either. Anxiety is 
a more fundamental mood, not tied to any particular events or experiences, but to our existence or 
world as a whole. In order to understand the elusive mood of anxiety better, interpreters tend to 
relate it to death, as Heidegger himself does at times. This is partly justified, partly problematic: (1.) 
Death indeed plays a crucial role for anxiety, also due to the fact that for death, we do not know 
when it will happen, and the impact which this uncertainty has on anxiety is at least as effective as 
not knowing when the detrimental entity will confront us in the case of fear. In both instances, the 
uncertainty increases rather than decreases our fear/anxiety. Yet in the case of death, the situation is 
nonetheless different because it cannot “stay away” – even though, due to its elusiveness, we tend to 
presume exactly that, on an everyday level. (2.) However, anxiety should not be exclusively linked 
to death, especially not to death as an event, but more generally to our finitude or mortality, and 
even more generally, to nothingness. Being and Time examines our existence and thus places 
particular weight on the nothingness of Dasein which is brought about by death. But there are 
moments in Being and Time which emphasize the significance of nothingness more generally, and 
the way in which it contributes to the world’s uncanniness.  
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The connection between anxiety and nothingness is helpful for our discussion because birth 
seems to evoke the kind of anxiousness – the term anxiousness is selected to avoid settling on either 
fear or anxiety for now – that is not related to death specifically, but indeed to our nature as finite 
beings with limited powers and capabilities. In other words, we are not usually afraid that we are 
actually going to die during the process of giving birth. Nowadays, this happens very rarely. 
Furthermore, whatever anxiousness we might have in that direction would not single out birth in 
relation to other bodily experiences such as, for example, small operations which usually carry a 
minimal chance of death (e.g., from anaesthesia) yet which do not normally make us anxious, or at 
least not in the same fashion as birth. 
It thus seems more plausible that any anxiety before and around birth is not caused by 
anxiety before death as such, but by a wider ontological anxiety which birth can indeed invoke. This 
ontological anxiety is best described by way of questions about this incomprehensible event. How 
would one finite creature be able to release another finite creature from itself? Does not embodied 
existence seem too fragile to be capable of undergoing an event of such unimaginable dimensions? 
Is not the exposure of existence to nothingness such that we cannot possibly imagine ourselves 
emerging from such an experience unscathed, in one piece, still in the body from which we started? 
The body which I used to inhabit by myself but which has come to house another creature whom I 
have not yet seen, which adds to making the event more mysterious and unimaginable. 
Yet at this stage, it should become obvious that in relation to birth in particular, but also in 
general, there is a counterpart to the nothingness that causes anxiety. The nothing is countered by 
the “there is.” As Leibniz put it, the question, “why is there something rather than nothing?” creates 
a fundamental and irresolvable puzzle for us.7 It is amazing that there is something rather than 
nothing; this amazement is usually referred to as awe or wonder. Birth is more obviously related to 
the “there is” than to the nothing that stands over against all things as their potential or actual end. 
Nonetheless, it is undoubtedly true that birth causes anxiousness, and although the anticipation of 
wonder might help to balance this anxiousness, it does not eliminate it. This is only appropriate, 
given the nature of wonder. What brings about wonder, in this instance, is exactly the fact that we 
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do not yet know what will emerge and cannot even imagine it, and that we cannot ultimately 
imagine that there will indeed be a living creature.  
When it comes to our objective of identifying the affects related to birth as fear or anxiety, it 
has thus emerged that anxiety as explained by Heidegger does not completely fit because the event 
of birth is not very closely connected to death or the nothing (except as its counter-pole, which is 
certainly not irrelevant). More importantly, Heidegger’s description of anxiety does not capture 
birth-related affects well because if asked what she was anxious about in relation to birth, the 
mother would not say that it was “nothing.” The indefinite character of anxiety and the fact that it 
can arise in any situation do not hold for birth. It is a specific event, an event that is coming close 
and yet will come about at an indefinite moment that is causing anxiousness. Nonetheless, it is not 
fear about a specific entity either.  
At this moment, we may ask whether this is not rather a shortcoming of Heidegger’s 
analysis more generally: apart from the contrast between fear and anxiety, are there not several 
closely related affects that fall outside of this division, at least in the way Heidegger sets it up? If 
fear is about an entity in the world and anxiety is about nothing specific (but the nothing that 
threatens the “there is”), it would seem that his account fails to apply to any events (specific, but not 
entities). Furthermore, he appears to have omitted the temporal dimension quite relevant for birth 
and many other events. What is at stake for birth as well as several other events is something like 
anticipatory anxiousness. Given that Heidegger explains so well how the entity coming close which 
might also stay away gives rise to heightened fear and also given the title Being and Time, it would 
be quite surprising if time ended up being one of Heidegger’s blind spots.  
Perhaps we need to expand Heidegger’s account and add new concepts aside from fear and 
anxiety to capture kindred affects? It turns out that Heidegger himself makes a suggestion in this 
direction at the end of Section 30; yet for him, this is a further specification within the category of 
fear: “thus various possibilities of fear result” (BT, 142). When something threatening suddenly 
indeed comes about, “fear becomes alarm (Erschrecken)” (ibid.). Furthermore, “when what 
threatens has the character of the completely unfamiliar, fear becomes horror (Grauen).” And when 
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these two come together, that is, when the unfamiliar and thus horrible comes so close that it is 
alarming, we experience “terror (Entsetzen)” (ibid.).  
These distinctions are helpful for continuing our analysis of birth-related affects. In 
particular, the characterization of something “completely unfamiliar” is fitting and is indeed crucial 
to the experience. Birth is an event that qualifies as entirely extra-ordinary, that is, outside of the 
ordinary, and completely unlike our everyday experiences. It is indeed completely unfamiliar as an 
experience, and this unfamiliar nature of the event is a major factor in the anxiousness that it 
causes.8 The unfamiliar nature of the event is linked to the fact that we cannot imagine the event, 
both because it is so unlike everything else and because as an event, it seems quite impossible. 
Every time that we try to imagine the event (and it is both useful as well as inevitable that we would 
try imagining it during pregnancy), this unfamiliar nature makes itself present and gives rise to what 
Heidegger calls horror. And once it becomes obvious that the process leading up to the event has 
suddenly begun and is in its early stages, such that birth is indeed coming close, there is alarm. This 
alarm combines with horror into terror – yet due to the anticipation of wonder, also a kind of 
excitement. 
At the end of the analysis of fear, Heidegger thus provides us with further categories that 
help capture the affects related to birth. For Heidegger, terror is still a version of fear. Yet the 
character of what is threatening here, namely, being completely unfamiliar, moves beyond the 
category of innerworldly being. If the threatening is an innerworldly entity of complete 
unfamiliarity, we can no longer pinpoint it. It could thus be an event of sorts, with dimensions that 
are causing the fear without being clearly identified as such. Especially if we consider that the 
entities causing fear also include other people (Mitdasein), a number of exemplary fears can be 
described. The situation might not be quite right, or the place might feel wrong, or there might not 
be the right people in terms of the health professionals. Furthermore, we might fear that the person 
whose support we were hoping for would somehow fail to be there, or be prevented by external 
circumstances. A version of such fears might thus be at stake – yet they would not quite capture the 
deeper level anxiousness. Here, the distinction between fear and anxiety becomes relevant again 
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which Heidegger introduces with the purpose of showing how anxiety is the more “fundamental” 
affect. Heidegger claims that anxiety “first makes fear possible” (BT, 186) as it is the deeper affect 
that reveals the precarious nature of our existence to us.  
We can conclude from our discussion that both fear and anxiety are involved in birth, in a 
peculiar combination. Birth brings us face to face with the nature of our existence that usually 
remains concealed. Our finitude is disclosed through the fact that we are not only mortal, but also 
come into the world in a way that we cannot grasp. Not only is it impossible for the creature who is 
being born to remember consciously how this happened, but even for the mother, the event is 
fundamentally unimaginable and ungraspable. It is an event of enormous existential and ontological 
magnitude, and nonetheless, the event has to be negotiated within a very mundane situation. 
Because birth happens within the tension of fear (as terror) and anxiety, seemingly small 
disturbances of the mundane level concerning the situation or interpersonal communication can 
easily undermine the precarious equilibrium. 
So far, we have seen that the distinction between fear and anxiety is useful in relation to 
birth. But we have not yet seen whether the distinction is complete or whether other affects 
belonging to the general realm of anxiousness should be considered. Furthermore, the issue of 
temporality has arisen as relevant; our next topic will thus be anticipatory anxiousness. 
 
Anticipatory Anxiousness 
There is a difference between fears and anxiety that come about once the actual birth process 
begins, and anticipatory anxiousness that affects women during pregnancy. Upon closer 
examination, there are actually four kinds of birth-related anxiousness to be considered here: 
1.) Anticipatory anxiousness. Such anxiousness relates to anticipating the birth process, and it 
can emerge quite some time ahead of birth, during any moment of the pregnancy. 
2.) Terror, or the kind of fear that emerges when it is clear that the birth process has begun. 
Heidegger’s term “terror” for describing the combination of alarm and horror seems indeed 
quite appropriate here. The experience of something radically unfamiliar and horrifying 
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(already by virtue of its unimaginable nature) has suddenly come close, and it is only a 
matter of hours. 
3.) Anxiety. As discussed above, birth or the close prospect of it can well lead to moments of 
revelation and thus anxiety about our ontological situation as finite creatures. The world in 
which we dwell as finite creatures is itself a landscape in which the “there is” constantly 
stands over against the nothing.  
4.) Fears emerging during the actual process. As explained in the previous section, the need to 
undergo an unfamiliar and inconceivable process in a mundane situation, and thus the stark 
contrast between the weighty and the ordinary, can well give rise to and exacerbate various 
fears about this situation. These fears might under different circumstances appear trivial, but 
in the face of such an existentially volatile situation, they are not. 
(2) is a version of (4), but nonetheless worth singling out for clarity. Yet what is the character of 
anticipatory anxiousness? It stands out in a number of ways. Firstly, it might seem that it should not 
be discussed in this article because it occurs during. However, it is clearly an anxiousness that is 
anticipatory of birth and thus relates to the close description of birth-related affects as undertaken 
here. Secondly, its character as anticipatory anxiousness involves a crucial temporal component 
which will provide an opportunity to examine the resources Heidegger provides in this respect. 
Thirdly, anticipatory anxiousness has a surprising empirical dimension which will be the starting 
point for our discussion. 
 From the perspective of empirical research in psychology, anticipatory anxiousness is 
peculiar because it stands in an unexpected correlation to the birth experience. Women who 
undergo anticipatory anxiousness are likely to fear that they might not cope very well with the 
actual birth process if already the prospect thereof is proving so unsettling. But there is unexpected 
good news: psychological research has proven that more anxiousness before birth correlates to a 
more positive birth experience. The article in which Crowe & von Baeyer present these findings 
concludes as follows: “This is the portrait of the woman who is most likely to have a positive 
childbirth experience: anxious and fearful (perhaps realistically so), yet competent in her knowledge 
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of the labour and delivery process and confident in her ability to control the pain associated with it” 
(Crowe & von Baeyer 1989, 63). Women were asked about their levels of anxiety when attending 
pre-natal classes, and this was compared to findings up to 48 hours after birth. While high anxiety 
levels during birth correlate to high pain levels, there is the reverse relation between high anxiety 
around the time of pre-natal classes and the actual birth experience.  
 The procedure that yields these findings proves somewhat questionable from the 
phenomenological perspective. The authors state that their usage of self-report measures makes 
their results susceptible to distorting factors. From the phenomenological perspective, any attempt 
at quantitatively measuring anxiety and pain is questionable because subjects selecting numbers 
from a pre-given range to gage their anxiety creates a substantial element of interpretation which is 
then concealed behind the numbers that convey an impression of objectivity and precision. More 
refined measures like the McGill Pain Questionnaire which was applied in this study involve a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative measures since the subjects are asked to choose terms to 
describe their pain. Yet such questionnaires bring in a wide semantic range (e.g., “pain as bad as it 
could possibly be”)9 that is neither explained nor explored, but simply translated into quantitative 
descriptors.  
 Despite these and similar hesitations, the result that is of interest to us here seems reliable 
and could have been yielded with a simplified interview mechanism. The reasons for the correlation 
between high anticipatory anxiousness and a positive birth experience, however, are not clear from 
the study. A phenomenological description allows understanding the result better since the 
description is closer to the explanation. Crowe & von Baeyer suggest that the correlation comes 
about because the women with higher anticipatory anxiety expected more pain and were thus 
positively surprised. But such an explanation would only be truly plausible if the pain experienced 
was of a definite level and independent of the expectation. Furthermore, the maxim “expect the 
worst and be positively surprised” can certainly not be applied as a mechanism for positively 
influencing experience in general. It may rather lead to discouragement which impacts negatively 
on the situation.  
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For birth in particular, the correlation previously mentioned between anxiety and fear during 
the process and a negative birth experience could be evoked by high anticipatory anxiousness. Why 
does this not happen? In their abstract, the authors suggest that this is because “women may have 
recognised and dealt with their concerns earlier” (Crowe & von Baeyer 1989, 59). Since the article 
concludes in general that knowledge, competence and confidence are factors contributing to a 
positive birth experience, the interpretation implies that it is because of their anticipatory 
anxiousness that women seek out information and prepare themselves better for the birth process. 
But anxiousness could also lead to repression, denial or a kind of debilitating nervousness that 
deters from mentally engaging with the process beforehand.  
 Why does anticipatory anxiousness as identified by the authors of the empirical article not 
lead to evasion and thus more likely to a negative birth experience? From the phenomenological 
perspective, it is relevant that these women report their anticipatory anxiousness. Admitting this 
anxiousness to an interviewer or questionnaire indicates the kind of awareness that points to a 
mental engagement with the process and affects involved in it. This also means that the “self-report 
measures” involved in this research which the authors consider a “limitation” of their research is 
indeed relevant: not as a limitation, but as a factor that picks out a specific affect which could be 
called “acknowledged anticipatory anxiousness”. In other words, those women who experience a 
debilitating level of nervousness are quite likely to not admit of it to themselves and others. But 
once anticipatory anxiousness has been identified and admitted, the authors’ suggestion that these 
women prepare themselves differently for the birth experience seems plausible. 
 However, to what extent is it even possible to prepare for a positive birth experience? What 
can anticipatory anxiousness motivate us to do? On the practical level, such preparation consists of 
various imaginative exercises which involve selecting place and circumstances for the birth (within 
certain limits of possibility), writing a birth plan, obtaining information about the process, possible 
remedies and interventions, etc. Why such mental exercises are helpful can be explained with the 
help of Heidegger’s philosophy, and moving to more general philosophical considerations at this 
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point can also be helpful in terms of dealing with other events that cause anticipatory anxiousness 
which can be addressed in equivalent ways.  
 For Heidegger, the crucial event which gives rise to the most fundamental anticipatory 
anxiousness is death. What Heidegger describes as anxiety is, in fact, always related to the most 
fundamental form of anxiety which is anticipatory anxiousness before death (though it has been 
emphasised above that anxiety must not be reduced to anxiety before death, but involves other 
phenomena related to nothingness and the overall groundless ontological scenario that we are 
facing). In his considerations on death, Heidegger presents the enigmatic notion of “anticipation of 
death (Vorlaufen zum Tode)” which sometimes leads to the distorted understanding that Heidegger 
encourages us to spend our existence reflecting on death. But he says explicitly that the idea of 
anticipating death does not mean “thinking about death,” let alone “brooding” over it (BT, 261). The 
point is not to think about death as death, but to grasp existence as something that always involves 
the possibility of death and is co-determined by this possibility. Death should be contemplated as a 
possibility, not in terms of its actuality. We relate “to something in its possibility by expecting it” 
(BT, 261), yet the difficulty consists in expecting it on the level of possibility rather than 
actualisation. An anticipation of death or a perception of existence as involving the possibility of 
death means to understand my existence as very much mine, and thus my responsibility. Since 
nobody else can die for me (at least not in such a way as to make me immortal), death individualises 
– as does birth. 
 There are some crucial parallels as well as differences where the anticipation of death versus 
that of birth is concerned. While death is relevant exactly as a possibility, an anticipation of birth 
involves anticipating its actualisation. Birth will be actualised, around a certain ‘due date’ or during 
several weeks before and up to two weeks after. When it comes to imagining birth as an encounter 
with the unfamiliar, it is an impending actuality that we imagine. However, there is an affinity 
between birth and death revealed by these thought experiments in the sense that both are 
individualising. Just like death makes me aware of my existence as ownmost and my responsibility, 
there is also a realisation that giving birth is my responsibility. This is the case all the more so since 
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such anticipatory engagements make me aware that the most vulnerable creature in the process is 
not me, but the infant. Hence, the connection to wonder. Wonder, however, here does not mean 
thinking about the ‘”cute baby,” but rather, astonishment that birth as an event is possible, and has 
been proven possible, by generations; yet it is one of the most ungraspable aspects of our existence. 
It is wonder as inextricably linked to anxiety, as will be discussed below. 
Before exploring more closely what the imaginative engagement with birth can consist in, 
the nature of anticipatory anxiousness will be explored a bit further from a phenomenological 
perspective. This exploration also sheds more light on the character of birth since an affect is 
always linked to that in the face of which it arises. For anticipatory anxiousness, the “anticipatory” 
character appears crucial. It is an affect that is defined by its temporality as future-directed. Already 
in his initial analysis of fear, Heidegger places emphasis on the way in which that in the face of 
which we fear is “coming near”, yet in such a way that it also “bears the revealed possibility of not 
happening and passing us by” (BT, 141). This possibility, Heidegger submits, “does not lessen or 
extinguish fearing, but enhances it” (ibid.). A first reaction to this description might be that birth 
does not fit this characteristic since it is definitely going to happen once pregnancy has occurred. 
True, there might be the terrible event of a miscarriage or the medical event of a Caesarian section, 
but the latter is still a form of birth and will be discussed below, and the former does not seem 
relevant to the experience of anticipatory anxiousness.10 If we ask more closely why the possibility 
of not happening enhances the fear, it turns out that birth indeed exhibits the relevant characteristics 
described by Heidegger. The reason as to why the possibility of the fearsome passing us by 
enhances fear is not because we are somehow also afraid of the entity’s staying away. Since the 
object or event is fearsome, its not-happening would be a cause for hope rather than fear. But since 
we do not know whether it will or will not come close, the uncertainty enhances the fear. 
 In other words, the uncertainties surrounding the fearsome are increasing the fear. 
Something is approaching, yet we do not know when it will occur, and not even whether it will 
definitely occur. Uncertainty is something with which we do not cope well because it makes us 
aware of our helplessness in relation to that which we fear. Taking appropriate measures, for 
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example, it significantly more difficult if we do not know when and whether something will 
happen. In the case of birth, its not-happening is indeed only possible in certain abnormal ways. The 
possibility of a Caesarian, however, is one of the factors contributing to anticipatory anxiousness 
since it is itself a cause of fear, for many women, and at the same time, it would make some of the 
other fears irrelevant. Since a scheduled Caesarian is unusual and should in any case (due to the 
increased danger of medical complications) not be a response to anticipatory anxiousness, the 
uncertainty of a (non-scheduled) Caesarian only adds a dimension of unpredictability and thus 
increases rather than decreases fear. In general, the unpredictable character of birth regarding its 
“when” and “how” is one of the main factors causing us to fear it, and Heidegger’s analysis proves 
helpful in this respect.  
Yet the temporal character of anticipatory anxiousness has so far only been a minor factor in 
the discussion, as one of several uncertainties surrounding birth. Given that Heidegger names his 
work Being and Time, we can rightfully expect time to be the focus. Heidegger states that the 
temporal dimension most relevant to affects is the past, or that which has been: “attunement 
temporalizes itself primarily in having-been” (BT, 340). This is surprising and, given our concern 
with anticipatory anxiousness, unhelpful. Yet Heidegger thematises this very problem in relation to 
his analysis of fear. He plays devil’s advocate and raises the concern that fear emerged as related to 
a “coming evil (malum futurum)” (BT, 341). It is true that fear emerges in the face of something 
coming, yet the basic character of affects nonetheless connects us to the past because affects reveal 
our thrownness or the fact “that we are” without being able to grasp or even access our own ground. 
 The groundlessness of our existence relates exactly to the inaccessibility of our own having 
been born. Not only do we have no access, by way of memory, to our birth, but we were born as 
thrown into this world that we did not bring about and that is on a primordial level uncanny. We 
enter this world as entirely helpless creatures to whom birth is presumably even more alien of an 
experience than to birth-giving adult women. To be sure, Heidegger does not usually discuss 
thrownness in terms of birth (and Hannah Arendt was the first of many to accuse him of this 
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omission)11, but given our emphasis in this study, it seems helpful to explain thrownness as revealed 
by affects in terms of birth, or having been born.  
Yet even if affects reveal and originally emerge from our being thrown and thus our having 
been born before we ever engage with our existence, the relevance for anticipatory anxiousness still 
needs to be clarified. Firstly, anxiousness before birth brings us face to face with the inaccessibility 
of our own birth and thus connects us to our uncanny origins. This connection thus explains better 
why the prospect of birth is existentially so relevant and connects us to a level of our existence 
where anxiety resides, as evoked by the realisation that we are, yet as emerging from and being 
held out into the nothing, as Heidegger would put it. To exist means to ex-sist (Latin ex-sistere), 
that is, to stand out (into).  Secondly, Heidegger shows how the three dimensions of temporality – 
past, present, future – are much less separate than it usually seems. The past “does not follow after 
Dasein but always already goes ahead of it” (BT, 20). Similarly, we are able to anticipate our future 
in the present, by way of our imagination. When it comes to birth, the intertwinement and mutual 
dependence of future and past creates special possibilities as well as a special weight. Birth is not 
just an event that happens at one definite moment in time, but an event that will accompany us, both 
infant and mother. The extreme case relevant to this realisation would be birth traumas which make 
it obvious that the impact of a terrifying birth experience has consequences for the long-term 
future.12 Yet it is the same interconnectedness that makes it possible to prepare for birth by way of 
the imagination, and to anticipate wonder. 
 
Wonder 
The parents’ experience of the newly born infant is that of a stranger or alien – even more so for the 
father than for the mother, but ultimately, for both. Because birth turns out to be an encounter with 
the infant as a stranger, there is an emotion complimentary to anxiety involved in the experience 
which can best be designated as wonder. Wonder emerges in the encounter with something new and 
unexpected, or with that which we cannot reliably anticipate. When it comes to birth, wonder is 
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certainly involved as an affect because there is suddenly a new creature, a new beginning, a new 
world.  
We can thus return to the first of the two widespread objections against Heidegger’s account 
as indicated above. Does the emphasis Heidegger places on anxiety make his account one-sided? 
The reason Heidegger focuses on the fear/anxiety contrast, as we have seen, lies in anxiety being a 
fundamental mood that has no specific object, but comes about by way of our being-in-the-world as 
such which is always threatened by nothingness. Fundamental affects are affects which determine 
our world as a whole, and when the affect is revealed to us, it reveals the world. We have now seen 
that there is at least one other such fundamental affect: wonder. Wonder emerges as a kind of 
counter-affect to anxiety, being invoked by the “there is” that stands over against the nothing. It is 
an affect relevant for our purposes because it is indeed an affect relevant to birth. Most of the 
interpreters who argue that Heidegger’s account of moods in Being and Time is one-sided claim that 
it is the emphasis on mortality rather than natality or death rather than birth that makes his account 
insufficient. Yet we have seen that anxiety also relates to birth.  
As both a phenomenological analysis of fundamental affects in general and a closer 
description of affects involved in birth reveal, wonder is by no means a straightforward opposite of 
anxiety. The story “Everything” by Ingeborg Bachmann already implies this complexity since 
wonder comes to evoke a new level of anxiety, an other-related anxiety. In this instance, the anxiety 
relates to preserving and protecting the new beginning which can best be understood in its radical 
newness by describing it with the help of the concept of world. “He was the first human. Everything 
began with him, and it was not excluded that everything might become entirely different through 
him.” (Bachmann 1987, 64). We will return to this description; for now, the passage only serves to 
suggest that what is at stake are “existential” emotions, weighty ones of the order that belong to 
birth and death, old and new worlds, and the possibility of new beginnings. 
 The general affinity between wonder and anxiety is indicated by the way in which the “there 
is” and the nothing belong together. We would not be amazed about the fact that there is something 
if it was not for its contrast with the nothing that stands over against it and seems ontologically the 
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more likely option. On the existential level, natality and mortality indeed signify our connectedness 
and exposure to the nothing. Our embodied existence exposes us to damage, injury, and accidents to 
such an extent that we have developed numerous mechanisms of ignoring and repressing these 
threats. This denial becomes habitual and contributes to our conviction that the death of others is an 
“undeniable ‘fact of experience’,” as Heidegger puts it (BT, 257) but my own death is nonetheless 
inconceivable. 
 On the wider ontological level, the nothing makes itself manifest by way of decay and 
disappearance. Being is not static, but is coming to be and ceasing to be, by way of ongoing circles 
of life and materiality. In these ways, we encounter nature. Heidegger rightfully points out that we 
have started to misconceive nature in mechanistic and technological terms, as something to be 
“mastered and possessed”13, and fail to see the original meaning of physis as “coming forth into 
itself” (Heidegger 2002, 21). Wonder designates exactly this amazement at the fact that animate and 
inanimate nature comes forth by itself and yet always remains in threat of falling back into the 
nothing from which it emerged. Hence the close connection between wonder and anxiety as 
fundamental affects.  
In response to the first objection, namely, that Heidegger places too much weight on anxiety 
at the expense of other fundamental affects, we can thus respond that his account is not one-sided 
since anxiety is intrinsically linked to its counter-affect, wonder. Overall, there is a very limited 
number of fundamental affects since they need to concern the world as a whole rather than 
individual entities in the world.14 Furthermore, it can be argued with the help of Heidegger that the 
link between the “there is” and the nothing is so intricate that there is only one fundamental affect 
that presents itself differently (with more emphasis on the “there is” or more emphasis on 
nothingness).15 Anxiety is the name for this fundamental mood as it shows itself when considering 
the nothing, and wonder is its name when it manifests by way of the “there is.” 
 The essential link between wonder and anxiety also becomes obvious in one particular 
feature of that in the face of which we experience this fundamental affect. That in the face of which 
we experience wonder or anxiety has a strong component of unfamiliarity. Wonder is related to the 
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unfamiliar as surprising and new, anxiety to the unfamiliar as uncanny and threatening. Yet in their 
radical manifestations, namely, as radically unfamiliar, the completely new and the uncanny indeed 
coincide. Birth brings this to the fore in an exemplary fashion. On some level, it seems entirely 
predictable that a baby will emerge; yet who and how this baby is cannot be anticipated, and the 
encounter with this unforeseeable Other brings about the “trauma of wonder” (Levinas 1969, 39). 
The Other whom we encounter in the infant is alien, in a wondrous as well as in a traumatizing 
fashion. The alien infant thus becomes a most intriguing manifestation of nature, not in the sense of 
mere organism but in the sense which Heidegger has reminded us of: coming forth by itself. In all 
his or her complete vulnerability and helplessness, the infant is nonetheless very much a thing of its 
own, independent and willful. 
 It becomes tempting to hope for this entirely new creature to come into his or her own 
without any external influences or intervention. Yet the realization of such a desire can only lead to 
tragic consequences, as Bachmann’s story shows to which we will now return. Fipps’ father 
experiences his newly son as something new that could bring about an entirely different beginning: 
“Everything began with him, and it was not excluded that everything might not also become 
entirely different, through him. Should I not leave the world to him, blank and without meaning?” 
(Bachmann 1987, 64). If it were possible to let Fipps grow up without introducing him to this world 
of engrained prejudices and customs, he might be able to reveal the nature of the human. Fipps’ 
father hopes for this nature to be something innocent and self-defined, something authentic, it 
seems.16 Such a new and different creature might finally be able to bring about a new beginning 
rather than simply following the ways of others. The father hopes that Fipps would listen to that 
which usually gets ignored, such as shadows, or the language of leaves (63).  
 Yet the hope is thwarted. Fipps’ father identifies the cause of this failure: language. “And 
suddenly I knew, it is all a question of language and not merely of this one language of ours that 
was created with others in Babel to confuse the world” (Bachmann 1987, 61 f.). Indeed, the 
meaning of the world is conveyed to us through language, in the narrow and in the wide sense, and 
through linguistic products: stories, songs, rhymes.17 But would it be possible to present Fipps with 
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a world that is “blank and without meaning”? No: this would be an isolated world, a world without 
others. The infant not only needs others (for comfort, support, food); he also wants others, is drawn 
by meaning, wants to participate in this world which seems exciting precisely because others have 
shaped it in multiple layers of meaning. Fipps becomes like the others, and his father cannot accept 
this. When Fipps is taken from this world through a school accident that is nobody’s fault, this 
event only serves as an external marker for a tragic development: the outcome of an experiment 
doomed to failure. Fipps’ father was right in sensing that birth shows how new beginnings and new 
worlds are possible -- but only on the basis of and in dialogue with the existent world. Without 
language which always bears traces of others, Fipps’ father cannot relate to Fipps and introduce him 
to this world which, despite the fact that “[h]ere, where we are standing, the world is the worst of all 
worlds, and no one has understood it up to now” (Bachmann 1987, 61), is still the only world we 
have and thus the starting point for everything else, including all new beginnings. 
 This world is a shared world, and we need the engagement with and relation to others. The 
infant exhibits this need in a primordial, immediate, unconditional fashion. Being the guide in 
somebody’s primal world encounter is an enormous opportunity and daunting responsibility. The 
event of birth is determined by a sense of this enormous responsibility. What does it mean to be the 
place where this impossible, incomprehensible, and entirely unfamiliar event is going to happen? 
How can we carry responsibility for another creature who is invisible up to birth and when visible, 
still unfamiliar and alien? Luckily, we do not need to find an answer to this question because we are 
always already carrying this responsibility, already during pregnancy. Over time, this realisation 
grows on us, naturally evoking wonder and anxiety. 
 
Conclusion: Who’s the Who? 
The questions at the end of the last section returned us to the main findings from this article. Birth 
seems impossible and yet is happening all the time, with a necessity that can be intimidating as well 
as reassuring. Birth gives rise to existential affects where anxiety and wonder are closely related 
because our existence is determined by natality as well as mortality, and on the ontological level, 
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the “there is” stands over against nothingness. In addition, the process of giving birth also evokes a 
variety of mundane affects, especially fears arising from the situation. These mundane fears can 
become volatile because they arise in conjunction with the weighty existential affects. 
 It is clear that it is me who is giving birth, and nobody else can do it for me. Nonetheless, the 
event and the affects involved are so complex that the “who” question is not a trivial one. Those 
who assist in the birth-giving (midwives, doctors, partners, doulas,…) should be aware of this 
complexity. It is due to the confrontation with weighty existential affects that seemingly small 
discordances on the mundane level can become quite disruptive. Being the one who gives birth 
means having to negotiate existential affects in a mundane situation and having to endure the 
tension between existential and mundane affects. Other people are a crucial dimension of the 
mundane situation we find ourselves in, and they have an enormous impact on our affects. The 
second objection against Heidegger’s phenomenology of affects as reported above has thus also 
proven misplaced. Even though Heidegger might not say much about the specific roles that others 
play in our lives, it is clear that the world in which we exist is essentially and through and through a 
world that we share with others. Furthermore, others are what affects us most, and by providing us 
with the most developed phenomenology of affects, Heidegger also gives us the resources to think 
about how others contribute to our affects, for better or worse. In sum, even though Heidegger does 
not elaborate in detail on the topic of the Other in Being and Time, his phenomenology of affects 
provides the condition for the possibility of reflecting on the role of others for our life, and this role 
cannot be overstated. 
 Especially our sense of self or of “who” we are is essentially determined by our relations to 
others. If the “who” is not taken seriously with her anxiety and fears, even those fears that might 
appear trivial, and if the body is treated like just a physical body, the “who” wants to withdraw. 
During the various stages of the birth process, the “who” of the experience can get so discouraged 
that there is no longer a “who.” Yet this is detrimental because at the end, it has to be me who owns 
up to the responsibility. There has to be a “who” to pluck up the necessary strength and 
determination.  
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The process involves so much fragility, waiting, unpredictability, dependence on others, and 
confrontation with affects, that the “who” can easily get crushed. If there is no longer a “who” to 
respond to the “who’s afraid” question, it becomes impossible to summon this “who” in the crucial 
moments. If all that is left are affects, that is, fears and anxiety, without a subject, medical 
interventions become much more likely. This is detrimental for anybody involved, and most of all 
for the “who” to re-emerge. This “who” wants to be able to look back and be able to say, who gave 
birth? Me. The fact that this impossible event did happen is a cause for anxiety and wonder, and 
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1 The decision to use the concept ‘affect’ for purposes of this article does not concern the difficult and 
ongoing discussion as to how the terms Befindlichkeit and Stimmung in Heidegger’s work should be 
translated. Stambaugh suggests ‘attunement’ and ‘mood’, Macquarrie and Robinson use the rather unhelpful 
‘state-of-mind’ and ‘mood’. When citing from Being and Time, I give the translation that seems most 
convincing or provide my own, without specifically indicating. All page numbers refer to the German 
edition; they are provided as marginal numbers in both English translations. 
2 It seems that Heidegger might be more sympathetic to phenomenological psychology, as some 
psychologists developed it following Husserl’s leads. Heidegger never states that psychology should be 
abandoned; he only points out that Daseinsontology precedes psychology and other sciences, and that the 
latter remain groundless if they do not consider ontological issues while constantly making implicit claims 
about being. 
3 Held’s article (1993) is intended to contribute to the heated debates about the connection between 
Heidegger’s philosophy and his brief period of sympathy for National Socialism. This political dimension is 
not relevant for our purposes here. Nor will we attend to Held’s suggestion that love would provide a helpful 
supplement to the one-sided focus on anxiety. I have argued elsewhere that this proposal is questionable 
since love does not seem to fulfil the definition of a fundamental mood (see [removed for blind review]). 
4 Held points out that there are a few exceptions even within Being and Time (BT, 391, 373 f.) and especially 
in later texts (Held 1993, fn. 53). 
5 E.g., in the case of a Caesarian. In turn, those women who fear a Caesarian most will normally indeed find 
themselves in a situation where what they fear might well pass them by.  
6 Heidegger introduces the term Dasein to avoid misleading understandings of the human being (like the 
ones to which traditional psychology ascribes, as outlined above). He explains the concept as follows: “This 
entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its being, we 
shall denote by the term ‘Dasein’” (BT, 27). 
7 Leibniz 1951, 527. 
8 This characterisation is appropriate even for the case of multiple births, though it then obviously needs to 
be qualified. Firstly, there is normally indeed more anxiousness connected to the first time of giving birth. 
Secondly, there are still sufficiently many unknowns for all subsequent births to justify the characterisation 
(e.g., will it be similar to the first time or entirely different? Timing, location, and mode are again almost 
entirely unpredictable). 
9 This is an interesting category since it involves the subject’s imaginative powers which have multiple 
dimensions, as introduced above. 
10 If we wanted to engage more closely with the possibility of miscarriage, it would actually confirm the 
Heideggerian characterisation since such a possibility indeed enhances rather than decreases fear. On a more 
general level, the possibility of premature birth can be a component of anticipatory anxiousness since one of 
the dimensions of the ungraspable character of birth might manifest by way of a sense of fearing for the 
infant to come out early. Yet this would not always be the case, and it thus still seems true that such events 
are irrelevant to the main characteristics and motivations of anticipatory anxiousness. 
11 Arendt 1999.  
12 See Ayers, Eagle, Waring, 2006 and Thomson, Dykes, Downe, 2011. 
13 As Descartes’s famous formulation of the “maîtres et possesseurs de la nature” has it (Descartes, Discours 
de la méthode, I, 6). 
14 Another one would be boredom (see Heidegger 1995).  
15 Heidegger makes this claim in his Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), but since the argument 
behind this suggestion is based on a framework of complex interconnected ideas beyond the scope of the 
current article, we will take the general ontological picture as indicative and Bachmann’s story as exemplary. 
16 Yet authenticity is itself a tricky concept, and the difficulties in understanding Heidegger’s usage of it 
(German Eigentlichkeit) show that it is questionable whether we can ever bring about something truly 
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authentic or be truly authentic, and if so, whether it would be possible to discern it as such. For a discussion 
of authenticity in Heidegger, see my [removed for blind review]. 
17 Just as Fipps mother, much to the father’s chagrin, seduces the son: “She stood unflinchingly bent over the 
nameless river and tried to draw him across, she walked up and down on our bank enticing him with 
chocolates and oranges, tops and teddy bears” (Bachmann 1987, 63). 
